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Abstract
We study the problem of defining similarity measures on preferences from a decision-theoretic
point of view. We propose a similarity measure, called probabilistic distance, that originates from the
Kendall’s tau function, a well-known concept in the statistical literature. We compare this measure
to other existing similarity measures on preferences. The key advantage of this measure is its
extensibility to accommodate partial preferences and uncertainty. We develop efficient methods to
compute this measure, exactly or approximately, under all circumstances. These methods make use
of recent advances in the area of Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss two applications
of the probabilistic distance: in the construction of the Decision-Theoretic Video Advisor (DIVA),
and in robustness analysis of a theory refinement technique for preference elicitation.
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1. Introduction
Imagine that Ms. Xaviera (let’s call her X), an avid cineast, is watching the Ebert &
Roeper show for their reviews of Kiss of the Dragon, a recently released movie. Ebert gives
it a thumb-up, but Roeper a thumb-down. Who should X listen to in deciding whether to
see the movie? While both are great film critics with whom she agrees most of the time,
recently X tends to agree more with Ebert, and thus decides to go out and see the movie.
X’s preference is more “similar” to Ebert’s than to Roeper’s.
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This approach to decision making is ubiquitous in our everyday life. We listen to
advice, judgment, recommendations from people with whom we share common interests,
tastes. Starting from this simple observation, the fledgling area of collaborative filtering
attempts to build systems that recommend items of interest (e.g., movies, music, books,
news articles) to people in a virtual community. Each user in the community rates various
alternatives according to a numeric scale. The filtering system correlates the ratings in order
to determine which users’ ratings are most similar to each other. Finally, the system predicts
how well users will like new items based on ratings from similar users. But exactly how
should preference similarity be modeled? Perhaps subconsciously, Xaviera has a measure
of similarity between her cinematic taste and those of Ebert and Roeper. How should we
capture this measure?
Until now, similarity measures used in existing recommender systems have been defined
on rather sketchy models of preference. For example, Amazon.com has a feature called
Customers who Bought that suggests to a user browsing a particular item A a list of
items bought by users that bought A. The assumption here is that people who express
some form of interest in a common item (by buying, or just browsing) may have common
interest in other items as well. In other examples, systems such as the GROUPLENS Usenet
article recommender [26], the RINGO music recommender [27], and the BELLCORE video
recommender [14], use a similarity measure that is defined on explicit numeric ratings that
people assign to items. While numeric ratings provide a more accurate model to capture
preferences than the naive Customers who Bought, they are still not expressive enough.
For example, if a person ranks a movie as a 5 on a 1-5 scale and later decides he likes
some other movies better, there is no way to accommodate this, without possibly having to
reassign ratings to many movies. A similarity measure based on a numeric rating scheme
is unable to accommodate even a simple pairwise preferential statement such as “Xaviera
likes Black Orpheus more than Lambada, the Forbidden Dance”.
So despite its intuitiveness, the concept of preference similarity is hitherto poorly
understood, especially if aspects of preferences such as trade-offs among competing
objectives, uncertainty, and attitude toward risk are also involved. Representing and
reasoning with these complex aspects of preferences are the realm of decision theory.
In this paper, we study the problem of defining, analyzing, and computing preference
similarity measures using decision theory as our backdrop. Two aspects of preference
similarity measures that mainly concern us here are (1) extensibility to accommodate
partial preferences and (2) amenability to efficient computation. While the second aspect is
self-evidently important, the first aspect is important because most of the time, the available
preference information is incomplete.
The focus of this paper is a similarity measure, called probabilistic distance,1 that has
its roots in the Kendall’s tau function, a well-known concept in the statistical literature.
We define the probabilistic distance in Section 3. In a nutshell, the probabilistic distance
between Xaviera’s cinematic taste and that of Ebert is the probability that they disagree
on a “randomly chosen” pair of movies (i.e., Xaviera prefers, say, the first to the second,
1 Technically, distance measures should be referred to as dissimilarity measures, in reverse scale against
similarity measures. For the sake of simplicity, we use distance measures and similarity measures interchangeably
whenever no misunderstanding is foreseen.
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while Ebert prefers the second to the first). Because this measure depends only on the
fundamental concept of preference (something is preferred to something else), it is flexible
enough to accommodate almost all aspects of preference. In the case when uncertainty is
involved and the preferential information is incomplete, the probabilistic distance is to our
knowledge the first measure of similarity on preferences.
Because the question of whether uncertainty is involved plays a significant role
in our analysis, we organize our discussion accordingly. Section 4 is devoted to the
case of certainty, and Section 5 to the case of uncertainty. In each case, we provide
a comprehensive analytical comparison of the probabilistic distance versus existing
similarity measures on preferences, whenever there is one. We provide efficient algorithms
to compute the probabilistic distance, exactly or approximately, in all cases. The main
ingredient of these algorithms is a Monte Carlo estimation method that makes use of a
number of recent advances on sampling with rapidly mixing Markov chains. In Section 6,
we describe two applications of the probabilistic distance. The first application is the
Decision-Theoretic Video Advisor (DIVA), a recommender system that implements a case-
based approach to preference elicitation [24]. Empirical analysis with DIVA shows that
the probabilistic distance provides better recommendations than the popular Pearson’s
correlation coefficient. The second application of the probabilistic distance is its use to
measure the degree of violating a domain theory for preference elicitation. We conclude
with a summary in Section 7.
2. Preliminary
We start our technical discussion by introducing the necessary background on orders,
partial orders, value functions, utility functions, and utility theory. We will occasionally
use the terms decision alternative and decision consequence interchangeably, as we are
mainly interested in the consequence of a decision.
2.1. Complete preference orders
A preference order ≺ on a set of decision consequences D is a weak order, i.e.,
an asymmetric (a ≺ b ⇒ b ≺ a), negatively transitive (a ≺ b, b ≺ c ⇒ a ≺ c) binary
relation on D. For a, b ∈D, a ≺ b indicates that the decision maker prefers b to a. When
neither of the two consequences is preferred to the other (a ≺ b, b ≺ a), we say that the
decision maker is indifferent between them and denote this relation by a ∼ b. We also
use the notation a  b to denote that the decision maker prefers b to a or is indifferent
between them. If for all a, b ∈ D, either a ≺ b or b ≺ a, we say that (D,≺) is a strict
order. An important technique that is often used in association with preference orders
is the use of consistent functions that capture preference orders. A real-valued function
f :D→ is said to be consistent with a preference order ≺ on D if for all a, b ∈ D,
a ≺ b⇔ f (a) < f (b). Any real-valued function f :D→ induces a preference order
≺f according to the above ⇔.
When the decision consequences are certain, we call them outcomes, and denote the set
of outcomes by Ω (thus D = Ω). We will assume throughout the paper that Ω is finite
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and Ω = {1,2, . . . , n}. It can be proven that for any preference order ≺ over Ω there exists
a function v, called a value function, that is consistent with ≺. Furthermore, if (Ω,≺) is
a strict order, then a value function consistent with ≺ is the permutation π :Ω →Ω that
satisfies that i ≺ j ⇔ π(i) < π(j),∀i, j ∈ Ω .2 We will refer to this permutation as the
canonical value function for the strict preference order ≺. In many applications, decision
outcomes are assigned non-negative numbers called ratings (for example, movie ratings,
news article ratings, etc). These ratings can be viewed as a value function if we assume that
higher ratings are preferred to lower ratings, and equal ratings are equally preferred.
When the decision consequences are uncertain, they can be modeled by probability
distributions over outcomes and are called prospects. We denote the set of all prospects,
which is the set of all probability distributions over Ω by S . The central result of von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility theory is a representation theorem that identifies a set of
conditions guaranteeing the existence of a function consistent with the preference of a
decision maker [35]. This theorem states that if the preference order of a decision maker
satisfies a few “rational” properties, then there exists a real-valued function, called a utility
function u :Ω →, over outcomes such that p ≺ q ⇔ 〈p,u〉 < 〈q,u〉. Here 〈p,u〉, the
inner product of the probability vector p and the utility vector u, is the expected value
of function u with respect to the distribution p: 〈p,u〉 = Ep[u]. It is often convenient to
extend u, by means of expectation, to a function u :S→ that maps a prospect p ∈ S to
〈p,u〉. This function is clearly consistent with the preference order (S,≺). In this paper,
we work only with preference orders that satisfy the above rational properties.
Two value (or utility) functions that induce identical preference orders are said to be
strategically equivalent. (Note that strategic equivalence is an equivalence relation, denoted
.) Otherwise, they are said to be strategically different.
2.2. Partial preference orders
How should one represent partial preferences? In most cases, partial preferences are
obtained via incomplete preference elicitation. For example, we may have determined that
the utility function of a person has a certain parametric form (e.g., multiplicative form),
but have yet to assess some parameters (e.g., a scaling coefficient, or a sub-utility function
of a multi-attribute utility function). In the case of certainty, we also encounter partial
preferences when a person assigns ratings or pairwise preferences to a subset of the set of
decision outcomes.
For the most generality, we assume that a partial preference order ≺ is a binary relation
on the set D of decision consequences. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that this
binary relation is asymmetric: if we know that a person prefers a to b, then it is not the
case that he prefers b to a. We may also assume transitivity: if he prefers a to b, and b to c,
then he prefers a to c. In the theory of orders, an asymmetric, transitive binary relation is a
called a partial order, or a poset. In this framework, we thus represent partial preferences
2 We abuse notation a little bit here. In the proposition i ≺ j , i and j are decision outcomes, while in the
proposition π(i) < π(j), π(i) and π(j) are integer numbers.
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using partial orders.3 We have a slightly different concept of consistent functions for partial
orders. A real-valued function f :D→  over the decision consequences is said to be
consistent with a partial preference order≺ if for any decision consequences a, b, a ≺ b⇒
f (a) < f (b) and a ∼ b⇒ f (a)= f (b). The set of all functions that are consistent with
≺ is denoted as C(≺). Intuitively, consistent functions capture all information contained
in the partial orders, and they might contain more than that. Consequently, functions that
are consistent with a partial preference order ≺ may be strategically different, as they
induce weak orders that are different extensions of ≺. There is however a one-to-one
correspondence between the weak order extensions of ≺ and the equivalence classes of
(C(≺),).
3. The probabilistic distance on preference orders
3.1. Probabilistic distance on complete preferences
We first formally define the probabilistic distance on complete preference orders. Let
the conflict indicator function c≺1,≺2 :D2 →{0,1} be defined as follows:
c≺1,≺2(a, b) :=


1 if (a 1 b ∧ b≺2 a)∨ (a ≺1 b ∧ b 2 a)
∨ (a 2 b ∧ b ≺1 a)∨ (a ≺2 b ∧ b 1 a),
0 otherwise.
The probabilistic distance is defined as:
δ(≺1,≺2) := Pr
(
c≺1,≺2(a, b)= 1
)= E[c≺1,≺2(a, b)]. (1)
Here the expectation is taken with respect to a and b, which are two independent
identically distributed uniform random variables on D. The probabilistic distance on
complete preference orders satisfies the following important property.
Theorem 1. In the case of certainty, the probabilistic distance on the set of weak orders on
Ω is a metric with range [0,1]. In the case of uncertainty, the probabilistic distance on the
set of “rational” weak orders on S is a metric with range [0,1].
Proof. Recall that the conditions for being a metric are:
(1) Reflexivity. δ(a, b) 0, “=” iff a = b.
(2) Symmetry. δ(a, b)= δ(b, a).
(3) Triangle Inequality. δ(a, b)+ δ(b, c) δ(a, c).
3 Note that the difference between the definition of complete preference order and that of partial preference
order is the difference between negative transitivity and transitivity. Given asymmetry, transitivity is weaker
than negative transitivity, i.e., the latter implies the former. This “weakness” reflects the incompleteness of our
information about the person’s preference.
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It is evident that the probabilistic distance only takes values between 0 and 1,4 the
distance between two identical orders is zero, and zero distance implies two identical weak
orders. The symmetry of the distance function trivially follows from the symmetry of the
conflict function. Finally, to prove the triangle inequality, we note that for all weak orders
≺i , i = 1,2,3, and alternatives a, b, c≺1,≺3(a, b)= 1 implies either c≺1,≺2(a, b) = 1 or
c≺2,≺3(a, b)= 1, and for all events X,Y , Pr(X ∨ Y ) Pr(X)+ Pr(Y ). ✷
3.2. Probabilistic distance on partial preferences
We can extend the definition of probabilistic distance to partial orders in the following
way. Let ≺1 and ≺2 be two partial orders with corresponding sets of weak order
extensions E1 and E2. Recall that Ei can be viewed as a set of strategically different
value/utility functions fi consistent with ≺i , for i = 1,2. These functions form a one-to-
one correspondence with the weak order extensions of≺i (note that in the uncertainty case,
the correspondence is with only extensions that satisfy the “rational properties” required
for the existence of a utility function). We define the probabilistic distance δ(≺1,≺2) to
be the average of the probabilistic distance between pairs of extensions of ≺1 and ≺2,
respectively. Formally,
δ(≺1,≺2)=E
[
δ(≺f1,≺f2)
]=E[E[c≺f1 ,≺f2 (a, b)
]]
,
where fi are uniform random variables on Ei , i = 1,2, and a and b are uniform random
variables on D. Note that this distance is not a metric on the set of partial orders, since
the distance between two identical partial orders that are not complete orders is always
positive (which violates the “indistinguishability of identicals” metric requirement). This,
however, is desirable if the two orders represent the preferences of two different users,
since the complete preference orders for the two may actually differ. For example, if we
know nothing about preferences of two people (i.e., their preferences orders are the vacuous
partial order), we would not want to say that their preferences are the same.
The reader may have noticed that the uniform distribution is used both in defining the
alternative variables (a, b), and the weak order extension variables (fi ). The short rationale
behind this is that we want to assume as little as possible about the problem at hand, while
still keeping it analytically tractable. The long rationale is the following. For alternative
variables (a and b), in a general setting one would not want to define a similarity measure
on preference structures that relies on some bias in the distributions of decision outcomes.
For weak order extension variables (fi ), it is sensible and technically easier to convert any
prior information about the preference orders ≺i (e.g., utility independence, risk attitudes,
etc.) into constrains on the sets of extensions Ei , rather than into probability distributions
on the set of extensions. This point is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.
On the other hand, in eliciting partial preference information, it is quite likely that there
is bias in what we have elicited information about, and that bias is induced by non-uniform
distributions of decision outcomes. For example, with movies, people are more likely to
express preferences about movies that they have some affinity for, since those are the ones
4 The exact range of the probabilistic distance can be a sub-interval of [0 1], in which case we may want to
scale it properly to [0 1].
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they were more likely to have watched. Thus, we acknowledge that a similarity measure
on two people’s preferences seems like it should perhaps take this into account. We leave
this question open for further research.
4. The case of certainty
4.1. The probabilistic distance on complete preferences
When the decision problem does not involve uncertainty, the distance δ(≺1,≺2) can
be computed by averaging the conflict function c≺1,≺2(i, j) over all n2 pairs (i, j) ∈Ω2.
In the case when both ≺1 and ≺2 are strict orders with corresponding canonical value
functions π1,π2, we have:
δ(≺1,≺2)= τ (π1,π2)
n2
,
where τ (π1,π2) is Kendall’s tau function [20] which simply returns the number of
conflicts. We can divide the Kendall’s tau function by n(n − 1) instead of n2 in order
to properly scale the probabilistic distance to the range of [0,1]. According to that scale,
the distance between a strict order and its complete reverse is 1.5
Example 1. Suppose that there are 3 decision outcomes (Ω = {1,2,3}) and 1 ≺1 2 ≺1 3
and 2 ≺2 3 ≺2 1. Then δ(≺1,≺2) = 4/9, since {(1,3), (3,1), (2,3), (3,2)} are the four
pairs of outcomes that cause conflict between ≺1 and ≺2.
Another popular metric on the set of permutations of {1,2, . . . , n} is Spearman’s rank
order correlation coefficient, or Spearman’s rho [29]:
ρ(π1,π2)=
∑n
i=1(π1(i)− n+12 )(π2(i)− n+12 )
n2−1
12
. (2)
Here, (n+ 1)/2 is the mean, and √(n2 − 1)/12 is the standard deviation of both π1 and
π2. Spearman’s rho is often computed using the following form:
ρ(π1,π2)= 1− 6R
2(π1,π2)
n3 − n ,
where R(π1,π2)= (∑ni=1(π1(i)− π2(i))2)1/2 is the Euclidean distance between the two
vector π1 and π2. Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau have been studied extensively in the
statistical literature. Other commonly used metrics include:
5 In Eq. (1), we can define δ by taking the average with a = b and thus avoid having to rescale Kendall’s tau
function. But we now have one uniform, joint probability distribution over all pairs (a, b) where a = b, instead of
two uniform distributions. This approach does not have an elegant generalization to the case of uncertainty, where
there are infinitely many alternatives. In this case, it appears that we need to revert back to the definition based
on two independent, uniformly distributed random variables. For this reason, we prefers the definition based on
individual uniform distributions for the sake of uniformity.
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– Spearman’s footrule [30]:F(π1,π2)= 12
n∑
i=1
∣∣π1(i)− π2(i)∣∣. (3)
– Ulam’s distance [33]:
U(π1,π2) = n—the max number of items ranked
in the same order by π1 and π2.
– Kemeny’s distance [19]:
K(π1,π2) = the min number of pairwise inversions
to obtain π2 from π1.
Ulam’s distance is used in DNA research to measure the distance between two strings of
molecules. Kemeny’s distance is used to define Kemeny ranking, which is a ranking that
aggregates a set of rankings in such a way that minimizes the total Kemeny’s distances
from the members of that set. Kemeny’s ranking is often used in social choice theory as
the best compromise between the possibly conflicting views of a set of judges (e.g., judges
in figure skating). See Critchlow [7] for a discussion of these metrics from a statistical
point of view.
These metrics can be used as distance measures on strict orders. But since their
definitions are all based on the canonical value functions of strict orders, it is not
straightforward to extend these metrics to define similarity measures on weak orders.
Furthermore, while it is possible to define distance measures between two weak orders ≺1
and ≺2 based on Spearman’s rho (see Eq. (2)) or Spearman’s footrule (see Eq. (3)) using
some functions π1 and π2 that are consistent with ≺1 and ≺2, respectively, the resulting
measures will apparently be sensitive to the choice of those functions. For example, in the
equation for Spearman’s rho (Eq. (2)), π1(i) and π2(i) may be replaced with ratings that
the two persons assign to item i , and (n+1)/2 may be replaced with corresponding means
π1,π2 and
√
(n2 − 1)/12 with the corresponding variances σ1, σ2 of these ratings. The
resulting p is the well-known Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
p(π1,π2)=
∑n
i=1(π1(i)− π1)(π2(i)− π2)
σ1σ2
.
The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the degree to which a linear relationship
exists between two variables (or in this case, two sets of ratings), and thus may be
unsuitable as a similarity measure between two variables having a close but non-
linear relationship. In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficient does not meet the
“indistinguishability of identicals” and the “triangle inequality” metric properties. Many
researchers have argued against the routine use of similarity measures that do not meet
the requirements of a metric [6,15]. Nevertheless, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and
several of its variants have been used as similarity measures quite extensively in many
fields. Within AI, notable recommender systems that make use of the Pearson correlation
coefficient include the GROUPLENS collaborative filtering system [21,26], the RINGO
music recommender [27], and the BELLCORE video recommender [14].
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4.2. The probabilistic distance on partial preferencesLet ≺1,≺2 be two partial orders with corresponding sets of weak order extensions
E1,E2. Recall that the probabilistic distance is defined as:
δ(≺1,≺2)=E
[
δ(≺f1,≺f2)
]=E[E[c≺f1 ,≺f2 (i, j)
]]
.
A simplistic approach to compute this quantity would be to evaluate the conflict function
c for all possible 4-tuples {(f1, f2, i, j) | f1 ∈ E1, f2 ∈ E2, i, j ∈ Ω} and compute the
average. This however is impractical because the number of weak order extensions of a
partial order can be exponentially large (the number of strict order extensions of a vacuous
partial order—a partial order in which everything is incomparable with everything else—is
n!). In fact, the much easier problem of counting linear extensions6 of finite posets was
shown to be # P-complete7 [3].
So the problem of computing the probabilistic distance becomes an issue for the
first time. Given the hardness of counting and generating linear extensions, we turn
to approximation techniques to estimate δp(≺1,≺2). For example, we can use the
Monte Carlo simulation method to estimate δp(≺1,≺2), provided that we have an
efficient algorithm to generate fi uniformly randomly from Ei . It turns out that counting
(approximately) and generating (uniformly randomly) elements of large combinatorial
sets are two closely related problems. In fact, Sinclair [28] showed that an efficient
algorithm for one problem can be used to construct an efficient algorithm for the other,
provided the combinatorial sets have a certain structural property called self-reducibility.
The set of linear extensions of a poset has this property and, not surprisingly, a number
of algorithms for generating (almost) uniformly randomly linear extensions of posets
have been developed [4,18]. These algorithms are all randomized algorithms based on
the Markov chain Monte Carlo technique.8 In Appendix A we describe the best known
algorithm, due to Bubley and Dyer [4] that has a running time of O(n3 lognε−1), where n
is the poset’s cardinality, and ε is the desired accuracy.
Now with the help of the routine that almost uniformly randomly generates linear exten-
sions of a poset, we can estimate δp(≺1,≺2) by randomly generating fij ∈ Ei (i = 1,2;
j = 1, . . . , k), computing δp(f1j , f2j ), j = 1, . . . , k, and taking the sample mean δˆp =
1
k
∑k
j=1 δp(f1j , f2j ). This sample mean is an unbiased estimator9 of EY = δp(≺1,≺2)
6 This is a fundamental problem in the theory of ordered sets with applications in computer science (sorting)
and social sciences.
7 The complexity class #P, introduced by Valiant [34], consists of all counting problems whose solutions are
the number of accepting states of some non-deterministic polynomial-time Turing Machine. A counting problem
is #P-complete if the problem of counting the number of satisfying assignments to a 3-SAT problem can be
reduced to it in polynomial time. #P-complete problems, which are analog counting counterparts of NP-complete
problems, are considered very difficult, especially in the view of Toda’s results [31], which implies that one call
to a #P-complete oracle suffices to solve any problem in the polynomial hierarchy in deterministic polynomial
time.
8 See [16] for a recent survey of this method.
9 Strictly speaking, δˆp is not an unbiased estimator for δp , since the routine only generates almost uniform
linear extensions. The incurred bias is insignificant and often simply ignored in Markov chain Monte Carlo
analysis.
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with variance (VarY )/k. We can derive a confidence interval for δp as follows. Let t be
the ratio of Y ’s variance and square of its expectation: t = VarY/(EY )2, a non-negative
quantity that can usually be bounded above by τ , which is polynomial in terms of n, the
input size. Thus VarY  τ (EY )2 and Var δˆp  (τ (EY )2)/k = (τδ2p)/k. For any positive
number c, Chebysev’s inequality states that:
Pr
(
(δˆp − δp)2 > cVar δˆp
)
 1/c,
and thus:
Pr
(
(δˆp − δp)2 > cτδ2p/k
)
 1/c,
or equivalently:
Pr
((
1−√cτ/k )δp  δˆp  (1+√cτ/k )δp) 1− 1/c.
As a consequence, if we want our estimator δˆp to be within a multiplicative factor of
1 + ε of δp with probability of at least 1 − 1/c, it is sufficient to take a sample of size
k = 4cτ/ε2.
4.3. Further notes on distance measures on partial orders
To our knowledge, there is no general theory that addresses the problem of defining
distance measures on partial orders. The closest to such theory we found is Critchlow’s
monograph [7]. Recall that on the strict orders on a finite set, there are a number of
well-studied metrics such as Spearman’s rho, Spearman’s footrule, Kendall’s tau, Ulam’s
distance, Hamming distance, and Cayley’s distance. In [7], strict orders are referred to
as fully ranked data, since they fully rank a set of items of interest. Critchlow extended
the aforementioned six metrics to partially ranked data. Here, partially ranked data refer
to certain special cases of partial orders. For example, they may correspond to the case
when a person lists his first through kth choices, where k < n (n is the number of decision
outcomes). Note that if fully ranked data are identified with the elements of the permutation
group (or, in layman’s term, the permutations of Ω), then the above partially ranked data
can be identified with points in a coset space of the permutation group. As a consequence,
this special case of partial orders facilitates several group-theoretic techniques and thus
makes the extended six metrics more amenable to analysis and computation.
Without a general theory of metrics on partial orders, researchers often extend metrics
such as the Pearson correlation coefficient to partial orders in some simple way. For
example, consider the GROUPLENS collaborative filtering system. Each user of the system
has rated a set of news articles, and different users have rated different sets of articles.
The similarity weight between two users is taken to be the Pearson correlation coefficient
between the ratings over the articles both have rated (i.e., the intersection of the two rating
sets). This solution could be unsatisfactory because it is insensitive to the number of articles
rated by both users. Two users having the same rating on the only one article they have both
rated would be maximally correlated, while their preferences may conceivably be quite
different. This intuition is confirmed by the experiments with DIVA [24] (see Section 6.1
for a description of DIVA and summary of the findings). Recent research on GROUPLENS
acknowledged this difficulty and proposed a significance weighting scheme to account
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for the size s of the intersection set [13]. Basically, the Pearson correlation coefficient is
multiplied with a significance weight of s/50 if s < 50. The modified similarity measure
was empirically shown to provide more accurate recommendation [13]. Another approach
to address the problem of small intersection was proposed by Breese et al. [2]. In this
approach, the correlation is computed over the union, instead of the intersection of the two
sets of ratings. This is made possible by assigning some default ratings to items that are in
the union but not in the intersection (i.e., the symmetric difference of the two sets).
5. The case of uncertainty
Our discussion thus far has dealt with similarity of preferences in the case of certainty.
The area of collaborative filtering is rich with examples of implemented systems that make
use of such similarity measures, e.g., GROUPLENS [26] and the DIVA video recommender
[24]. But many potential applications require the ability to define similarity of preference
under uncertainty. Examples include medical decision making, financial decision making,
and travel planning. (An effort along this line can be found in the work of Chajewska
et al. [5], who cast the problem of eliciting utilities as a classification problem.) In order
to serve as a basis for developing applications, it is important to have a measure of
preference similarity that is both intuitive and amenable to efficient computation. The
following example highlights some of the difficulties with defining appropriate similarity
measures on preferences, when “uncertainty aspects” such as attitude toward risk have to
be considered.
Miyamoto and Eraker [23] described a psychology experiment with 44 undergraduate
students at the University of Michigan. The experiment is designed to test several
assumptions about people’s preferences and attitudes toward risks with regard to survival
duration. The subjects were asked to assign certainty equivalences (CE) to a total of
42 standard gamble questions (SGQ) involving duration of survival. Below is a typical
question:
For any non-negative number n, let n be the event that you will live exactly n more years
in good health, and then have a sudden and relatively painless death. Let (m, .5, n),
0m< n, be a lottery of 50% chance for m and 50% chance for n. What is the number
p for which you regard (m, .5, n) and p as equivalent (denoted (m, .5, n)∼ p)?
Suppose that u denotes the utility function of a subject. Each answer of the form
(m, .5, n) ∼ p translates into the following constraint on u: u(m)+ u(n) = 2u(p). Thus
for each subject, we have a set of 42 constraints on his/her utility function u. Given two
subjects with utility functions u and u′, how should we define a distance measure between
u and u′? A simplistic approach may use some well-known statistical measures such as
Spearman’s footrule, Ulam distance, or various correlation coefficients. The problem with
this approach is similar to the problem that plagues these statistical measures in the case of
certainty. Specifically, such a distance measure can be defined only on (and thus sensitive
to the size of) the intersection of the two sets of CE questions constraining u and u′.
In addition, it is conceptually difficult to see how well, compared to each other, these
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statistical measures can capture intricate aspects of preferences such as attitude toward
risk. Another possible approach is to completely determine u and u′ (using methods
such as interpolation, curve-fitting, or parameter estimation), and compute the distance
between two completely specified utility functions. We believe that because of the strong
assumptions required to determine the complete utility functions, the suitability of this
approach can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. As we shall show in this section,
the probabilistic distance provides a principled solution for this problem that can be used
in a wide range of other problems as well.
5.1. The probabilistic distance on complete preferences
Let ≺1 and ≺2 be two preference orders on the set S of prospects. The probabilistic
distance is defined as:
δ(≺1,≺2)=E
[
c≺1,≺2(p, q)
]=
∫
D
∫
D
c≺1,≺2(p, q) ∂p ∂q. (4)
where p and q are two independent identically distributed uniform random variables on the
set D of decision consequences. Note that the set D of decision consequences is a simplex
in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space. A uniform random variable on D can be defined
using the standard method of measure and probability theory.
Example 2. Let Ω = {1,2,3} and ≺α,0  α  1 be preference orders on the set S of
all prospects over Ω with corresponding utility functions uα = (0, α,1) (i.e., uα(1)= 0,
uα(2)= α, and uα(3)= 1). Then for 0 β  α  110
δ(≺α,≺β)= d(α,β) := α− β3 .
Let β = 0. Observe that d(0,0) = 0, d(.5,0) = 1/6, d(1,0) = 1/3. As α increases, the
utility function uα becomes less and less similar to u0. This is reflected in the monotonic
increase of d(α,0)= α/3, which tends to 1/3 as α tends to 1.
When D = S , i.e., the set of decision consequences is the same as the set of all
prospects, computing the above integral amounts to computing the volume of a polytope
in the (2n − 2)-dimension space (both p and q have n − 1 coordinates that can vary).
While computing the exact volume of a polytope in general is computationally complex
[1,10], there is a simple Monte Carlo approximation algorithm for this particular problem.
This algorithm works by sampling pi , i = 1,2, . . . , k, and qi , i = 1,2, . . . , k, according to
the uniform distribution on S , and taking the average c = 1
k
∑k
i=1 c≺1,≺2(pi, qi). With a
sufficiently big sample size k, the sample mean c can approximate δ(≺1,≺2) with arbitrary
degree of precision, according to the Weak Law of Large Numbers. Sampling pi and qi
according to the uniform distribution on S is basically the well-studied problem of random
10 The computation of this distance is straightforward with the help of the Maple® symbolic algebra package,
albeit rather tedious.
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Table 1
Algorithm for uniform sampling on S
1. Generate n− 1 numbers xi , i = 1,2, . . . , n − 1, according to n− 1 independent
uniform random variables on [0,1].
2. Sort xi ’s: 0  x(1)  x(2)  · · ·  x(n−1)  1. This is the order statistics of the
sample. Let x(0) = 0 and x(n) = 1.
3. Let pi = x(i)−x(i−1), i = 1,2, . . . , n. (pi ’s are called the spacings of the sample.)
Return (p1,p2, . . . ,pn).
division of the unit interval and can be performed using the algorithm in Table 1. This
algorithm has a time complexity of O(n logn). See [8,25] for more details.
The probabilistic distance between two preference orders, defined this way, depends
only on the orders. It can be computed given the two orders, or two utility functions
that are consistent with the two orders. This definition can be useful when the two
preference orders, or the two consistent utility functions are given, but little is known about
the available decision alternatives. When we have more information about the decision
alternatives and their consequences, it is desirable that we tailor the definition of the
probabilistic distance to reflect this knowledge. So if the set D of decision consequences is
finite and known, the probabilistic distance can be defined as:
δ(≺1,≺2)=
∑
(p,q)∈D2 c≺1,≺2(p, q)
|D|2 . (5)
The computation of this (discrete) formula is obviously much simpler than the integral
formula of Eq. (4), provided that we know the set of decision alternatives D. In addition,
it is a subtle issue to determine which decision alternatives to include in D in the above
definition. We may also replace |D|2 with |D|(|D| − 1) so that the distance δ scales to the
range of [0,1].
5.2. The probabilistic distance on partial preferences
Let ≺1 and ≺2 be the partial preference orders of two persons, A1 and A2. Recall that
the probabilistic distance δ(≺1,≺2) is defined as:
δ(≺1,≺2)=E
[
δ(≺f1,≺f2)
]
,
where f1, f2 are uniform random variables on E1,E2, the sets of weak order extensions of
≺1,≺2, respectively. Exactly how should we interpret this definition? In the certainty case,
this is easy since E1 and E2 are finite sets (a finite poset has only finitely many extensions)
and we can just take the average of {δ(≺f1,≺f2) | f1 ∈ E1, f2 ∈ E2}. But in the case of
uncertainty, the set E1 and E2 are typically infinite. For example, consider a typical partial
preference elicitation process. We may have determined that the utility function of A1 is
additive over two binary attributes {x1, x2}:
u(x)= k1u1(x1)+ k2u2(x2), k1, k2  0. (6)
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In addition, we have also elicited the sub-utility functions u1, u2. We have not, however,
assessed the scaling constants (or trade-off coefficients) k1, k2. The set E1 is thus the set
of all utility functions of the form in Eq. (6), which is obviously infinite.
5.2.1. Partial utility functions as polyhedral cones
Defining the expectation of a quantity involving random variables over infinite, multi-
dimensional domains often requires the language and formalism of measure theory. With a
simplifying assumption, however, we can define the probabilistic distance δ using more
elementary concepts. Note that since a utility function u :Ω →  can be viewed as a
point in the n-dimensional Euclidean space n: u = (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(n)), we can (and
will) talk about the sets E1,E2 of consistent utility functions as sets of points in n. The
simplifying assumption we shall make regarding E1,E2 is that they are determined by
linear, homogeneous inequalities. Formally, they are sets of the forms{u ∈n |Au 0}, (7)
whereA is somem×n matrix of real numbers, and −→0 is the m×1 zero vector. In geometric
terms, such a set is the intersection of m half-spaces, each of which crosses the origin
and having one of the rows of matrix A as its outward normal vector, and is called a
polyhedral cone. Partial utility functions satisfying the above assumption encompass most
of the common kinds of partial utility functions encountered in the practice of decision
analysis. For example, a multi-linear utility function with known sub-utility functions and
unknown scaling coefficients, a model studied in [11], satisfies this assumption. It is not
difficult to see that the same is true for multiplicative and additive utility functions with
known sub-utility functions and unknown scaling constants. Furthermore, a constraint on
the partial preference order ! of the form p ! q , for some p,q ∈ S would also translate to
a homogeneous linear inequality: 〈u,p− q〉 0.
The nice thing of having E1 and E2 as polyhedral cones is that in the defining formula
of the probabilistic distance
δ(≺1,≺2)=E
[
δ(≺f1,≺f2)
]=
∫
E1
∫
E2
∫
D
∫
D
c≺f1 ,≺f2 (p, q)∂f1 ∂f2 ∂p ∂q,
we can interpret the integral on the right hand side as the volume of a bounded polyhedral
cone in some multi-dimensional Euclidean space. But more importantly, we can reduce
the problem of computing the probabilistic distance on partially specified utility functions
to the well-studied problem of computing the volume of polyhedral cones. (In fact, the
problem of computing the probabilistic distance on partial orders in the certainty case
can also be reduced to the volume-computing problem, using some elementary geometric
arguments.)
5.2.2. Computing the volume of convex bodies
The problem of computing the volume of convex bodies has received considerable
interest in the theoretical computer science community in the past fifteen years. Early
results were negative for the prospect of finding an efficient deterministic algorithm [1].
But randomization techniques once again come to the rescue. The first work that uses
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randomization to obtain a polynomial time algorithm for this problem is due to Dyer
et al. [9]. A series of work followed and refined the algorithm of Dyer et al., substantially
reducing its complexity [22]. These results are all based on various Markov chain-based
sampling techniques that sample points from the convex body according to a nearly
uniform distribution. The convex body is input to the algorithm by means of a membership
oracle, i.e., a black box that answers whether a given point belongs to the convex body.
Note that this requirement fits excellently with the assumption that the set E1,E2 are
polyhedral cones determined by a set of homogeneous linear inequalities as in Eq. (7):
we can check if a utility function u is consistent if Au 0 in time O(m) (recall that m is
the number of rows of A).
We now sketch out the main ideas behind the sampling algorithm. To sample uniformly
from a convex body K , we perform a random walk on the points of K . Starting at an
arbitrary point inside K , we move at each step to a uniformly selected random point in a
ball of radius ε about the current point if this remains inside K . If the new point is outside
K , we remain where we were. The size ε of the radius is typically 1/
√
n. It follows from
elementary Markov chain theory that the distribution of the point after t steps tends to the
uniform distribution as t tends to infinity. The crucial issue is, how long to walk before the
walking point becomes nearly uniformly distributed? There are two reasons for needing a
long walk: we have to get to the “distant parts” of K , and we may get stuck in “corners”,
especially “sharp corners” of K . The first reason suggests that we choose a step-size that
is large enough relative to the diameter of K , while the probability of the second can
be reduced by choosing a small step-size. A number of advanced techniques have been
developed to address this dilemma to ensure that the Markov chain settles quickly to a
nearly uniform distribution (in technical terms, such a chain is called rapidly mixing). See
Lovász et al. [22] for a comprehensive treatment of this topic.
While this Markov chain-based sampling algorithm was developed for the purpose of
computing the volume of convex bodies (and thus can be used to compute the volume
of the polyhedron that is δ(≺1,≺2)), we can use it directly to perform a Monte Carlo
estimation of the probabilistic distance on partial utility functions. Specifically, we can
estimate δ(≺1,≺2) by sampling fij , i = 1,2, j = 1,2, . . . , k, according to nearly uniform
distributions on Ei , and taking the average δ = 1k
∑k
i=1 δ(f1j , f2j ). Again, the Weak Law
of Large Numbers ensures that with a sufficiently large sample size k, the sample mean δ
can approximate δ(≺1,≺2) with arbitrary degree of precision.
5.3. An illustrative example
We illustrate the algorithm to compute the probabilistic distance on partially specified
utility functions. The data we use are taken from the psychology experiment by Miyamoto
and Eraker [23], as described at the beginning of Section 5. Out of the 44 subjects, 6
were dropped due to failure to complete the interview in the allocated time, or failure to
understand the CE task. The effective sample size is thus 38. There are a total of 42 CE
questions for each subject (see Table 2). Note that in this experiment, subjects are not asked
about their preferences with respect to specific decision alternatives. As a consequence, it is
not possible to define, based on this data set, a distance measure that requires the knowledge
of the decision alternatives (Eq. (5)).
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Table 2
Table describing the 42 standard gamble questions used in the psychology
experiment by Miyamoto and Eraker [23]. X/Y denotes a 50/50 gamble
between X and Y years of survival
Basic Times 2 Times 3 Plus 10 Plus 20 Zero
1/10 2/20 3/30 11/20 21/30 0/32
2/10 4/20 6/30 12/20 22/30 0/36
3/10 6/20 9/30 13/20 23/30
4/10 8/20 12/30 14/20 24/30
1/12 2/24 3/36 11/22 21/32
2/12 4/24 6/36 12/22 22/32
3/12 6/24 9/36 13/22 23/32
4/12 8/24 12/36 14/22 24/32
5.3.1. Computing the probabilistic distance on the subjects for clustering
Since the survival duration in the CE questions ranges from 0 to 36, we scale the utility
functions so that u(0) = 0 and u(36) = 1. The next step is to discretize the outcome
space, which is discretizing the number of years of survival. This is necessary because
our framework requires that the set of decision outcomes is finite. Because each subject
gave four different answers (at four different time points) to each CE question, we take
the average of the 4 answers as the CE. Because each answer is either an integer or an
integer plus 0.5 (e.g., (1, .5,10)∼ 4.5), we discretize the number of years of survival to
the granularity of 1/8,11 resulting in 36× 8+ 1 = 289 outcomes. We also assume that all
subjects prefer longer survival to shorter survival: u(i/8) u((i+1)/8), i = 0,1, . . . ,287.
Framed this way, the utility function u of each subject has a total of 288 inequality
constraints and 42+2= 44 equality constraints. It is easy to see that these linear constraints
determine a convex set of consistent utility functions.
To find a starting point for the random walk, we need to find a consistent utility function,
i.e., a feasible solution for the linear constraints. For this we use the linear programming
facility LINPROG of Matlab® Optimization Toolbox, with some randomly generated target
function. Interestingly, we found that out of the 38 subjects, only 3 provided consistent
answers; the rest provided answers that lead to linear programs that are infeasible. This
inconsistency can be attributed to the fact that the expected utility paradigm is normative
but not descriptive [17]. An example of this school of thought is the approach called
subjective expected utility (SEU) [32], according to which a CE statement (m, .5, n)∼ p
translates into the equation: (1−w(.5))u(m)+w(.5)u(n)= u(p). Here 0 <w(.5) < 1 is
the probability distortion for a .5 probability applying to the superior outcome. Note that
in the standard expected utility paradigm, w(.5)= .5.
But even with more general utility models such as SEU, it is likely that subjects will
have inconsistent preferences, due to variations in subject responses. Our approach is to
stay within the standard expected utility paradigm and account for the inconsistency in
some way. While the fact that random error in judgment exists is well-known, the question
11 For example, if the four answers for the (1, .5,10) question are (4, 4, 4, 4.5), then the average of these four
answers is 4.125.
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of how to deal with it remains open. For the purpose of our experiment, we take the
following simple approach. We keep all of the 288 inequality constraints that capture the
“longer survival is better” assumption. For each subject, from the set of the 42 equality
constraints provided by the CE answers, we incrementally randomly add one at a time
to LINPROG and keep doing this as long as a feasible solution exists. Note that due to
differences between subjects’ responses and the randomness of this method, different sets
of CE answers may be taken into account for different subjects. Fortunately, this is not a
problem for the probabilistic distance.
Now that a set of consistent CE answers is selected for each subject, we simultaneously
start 38 random walks from 38 consistent utility functions, one for each subject. The radius
ε of the ball is initialized to 0.001. At each iteration, we generate a random point in each
ball of radius ε. If the generated point is consistent with the constraints, we move to the
new point and mark the iteration a success; otherwise we stay at the current location and
call the iteration a failure. If two successes occur consecutively, we double the radius. If
two failures occur consecutively, we halve the radius. We stop the random walk after 1000
iterations, at which point we obtain a random sample of consistent utility functions for
the 38 subjects. We compute the distance between any two consistent utility functions and
record the distances in a square dissimilarity matrix of size 38 × 38. This computation
is performed by a routine that implements the algorithm in Table 1. We repeat the whole
process for a total of 1000 times, updating the averages of the distances as we go. We can
use this distance matrix, for example, to compute clusters of subjects. Fig. 1 shows the
hierarchical cluster obtained using the ClustanGraphics® package. The method used was
average-linkage.12
5.3.2. Relation to attitude toward risk
Observe that in this psychology experiment, since there is a single attribute—the
duration of survival in number of years—the difference of one subject’s preference from
another’s is in essence the difference in attitudes toward risk (ATR). It is thus interesting
to see if there is some correlation between ATR and the probabilistic distance we just
computed.
12 All of the code was written in Java™ and the mathematical programming language of MatLab®. The
computations were performed on an Athlon™@850Mhz system with 512MB RAM running Windows® 2000,
and took about 30 minutes to finish.
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How should we define and measure ATR? We take the following straightforward
approach. Consider a SGQ (l, .5, u) to which the answer from a subject X is ce, i.e.,
(l, .5, u)∼ ce, and l < ce < u. Define the proportional match of this SGQ as:
pm= ce− l
u− l .
Intuitively, subject X is risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-seeking respectively if pm< .5,
pm = .5, and pm > .5 respectively. We thus may define the attitude toward risk of X as
the sample average of pm, averaging over 42 SGQ’s:
ATR(X)= avg{pm | 42 answers}.
The ATR values for the 38 subjects range from .16 to .75, with an average of .448 and
standard deviation of .126. We analyze the correlation between ATR and the probabilistic
distance in the following way. We consider each ordered triple of subjects (X,Y,Z). We
look at the probabilistic distance δ(X,Y ) and δ(X,Z) to see which of the two subjects
Y and Z is closer to subject X. We then look at the ATR of X, Y , and Z to see which
of the two ATR’s of subjects Y and Z is closer to the ATR of X (i.e., which of the
two quantities |ATR(Y ) − ATR(X)| and |ATR(Z) − ATR(X)| is smaller). If the answers
in both instances match, we mark the ordered triple (X,Y,Z) as OK. We then compute
the percentage of ordered triple of subjects that is marked OK out of all possible ordered
triples. This percentage is in between 72% and 80%, depending on the number of iterations
used in computing the probabilistic distance. This shows that there is a strong correlation
between the probabilistic distance and the ATR, since the correlation between ATR and a
random distance measure can be shown to be approximately 33%.
5.4. Related work on similarity measures on utility functions
The only existing similarity measure on preferences in the case of uncertainty that
we are aware of is defined in Chajewska et al. [5]. This measure is also based on a
finite set of decision alternatives. But in contrast to the probabilistic distance that is
defined based on the preference orders, this measure is defined based on consistent utility
functions. Specifically, let u1 and u2 be two utility functions, and the decision alternatives
be {p1,p2, . . . , pm}, indexed in such a way that i = argmaxj :1jm〈ui,pj 〉, i = 1,2. This
means that according to the utility function ui , pi is an optimal decision alternative, for
i = 1,2. The distance between u1 and u2 is defined as
d(u1, u2)= 〈u1,p1〉 − 〈u1,p2〉 + 〈u2,p2〉 − 〈u2,p1〉2 .
The difference of the first two terms in the above numerator, 〈u1,p1〉 − 〈u1,p2〉, is called
the utility loss of u1 with respect to u2, and that of the last two terms is the utility loss of
u2 with respect to u1. The utility loss of one utility function with respect to another is the
difference of, or loss in expected utility by choosing a decision alternative that is optimal
according to the latter instead of the former.
There are several issues with this definition of distance between utility functions. First,
this is a similarity measure between utility functions. If it is to be used as a measure
of similarity between preference orders, one must deal with the issue of choosing the
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corresponding consistent utility functions. A standard solution is to scale the consistent
functions to the range of [0,1] (a sort of the equivalence of canonical value functions for
strict orders in the definition of Spearman’s rho in the case of certainty). The second issue is
that since this measure focuses on optimal decision consequences, it can become vacuous
if there is a clear optimal decision alternative, a “clear winner” among the competing
candidates. Formally, suppose that p1 is the optimal decision alternative according to both
u1 and u2, then d(u1, u2) = 0. The implication here is that the two preference orders
are maximally similar, while the truth beneath is that they only agree on choosing the
“clear winner”. On the other hand, depending on the intended use, this measure can still be
useful—imagine that it is used only under circumstances when there is no “clear winner”.
The third, mainly technical issue is that, strictly speaking, this distance is not well-defined,
since argmaxj : 1jm〈ui,pj 〉, i = 1,2, are not well-defined. Suppose for example that in
addition to p1, p3 is also an optimal decision alternative according to the utility function
u1. Replacing p1 with p3 in the defining formula for this distance may result in a different
value, since 〈u2,p3〉 may be different from 〈u2,p1〉. But again, depending on the intended
use of the distance measure, this variance may not play an important role. Finally, as
Chajewska et al. noted, this distance measure is not a metric since it does not satisfy the
triangle inequality.
What other kinds of similarity measure can be defined on preferences in the uncertainty
case? An immediate thought that comes to one’s mind is to extend measures such as
Pearson’s coefficient, Spearman’s footrule, etc. to accommodate utility functions. This
generalization, however, has another difficulty beside the issue of scaling the utility
functions. To see why, let us consider how we might define Spearman’s footrule on utility
functions:
F(u1, u2)=
n∑
i=1
∣∣u1(i)− u2(i)∣∣. (8)
As Chajewska et al. noted, this approach gives all outcomes equal weight: a difference in
utility for a highly probable outcome contributes the same to F as the same difference in
utility for a highly improbable outcome. In other words, generalizing similarity measures
to utility functions this way cannot account for any a priori knowledge about the resulting
decision consequences.
It is interesting to see what happens to the Pearson correlation coefficient on utility
functions. Since strategically equivalent utility functions are positive linear transformations
of each other, they are maximally similar (or perfectly correlated) according to the
Pearson’s measure.
6. Applications
6.1. The decision-theoretic video advisor
Nguyen and Haddawy [24] describe the Decision-Theoretic Video Advisor (DIVA), a
collaborative filtering system that uses the probabilistic distance measure to determine
similarity of user preferences over movies. DIVA represents user preferences as complete
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or partial orders over the set of all movies in its database. It maintains a population
of users with their preferences over movies partially or completely specified. When a
new user A comes to the system, it elicits some preference information from A and
then determines which user in the population has a preference structure most similar to
that of A. It then uses that preference structure to supplement A’s directly expressed
preferences, resulting in a complete order over movies. A recommendation list of the top
N ranked movies is then displayed to A. If an old user accesses the system, DIVA simply
retrieves that users’s stored preference structure. Fig. 2 provides a schematic view of this
approach.
In DIVA, partial preference orders of users consist of pair-wise preferences, which are
obtained by having the user classify movies into like, ok, and dislike categories. DIVA
also has an interface where the user can provide feedback on recommended movies. The
feedback options are: (1) I have seen this movie already and liked it, (2) I have seen this
movie already and did not like it, and (3) I have not seen this movie, but know that I would
not like to see it (interpreted as dislike). Pairwise preferences are obtained by inferring that
every movie classified as like is preferred to those classified as ok or dislike and, similarly,
every movie classified as ok is preferred to every one classified as dislike.
The probabilistic distance is computed by using an implementation of the sampling
algorithm by Bubley and Dyer (see Appendix A). First the similarity between the active
user and each user in the population is computed. Then the most similar user is selected
and the sampled linear extension of the active user most similar to that user is chosen as the
complete representation of the active user’s preferences. In this way the sampling process
is used to both compute similarity and to generate predicted preferences.
Nguyen and Haddawy compared the performance of DIVA with that of the GroupLens
collaborative filtering algorithm [26] using the EachMovie database, courtesy of the Digital
Equipment Corporation. The GroupLens algorithm works with preferences represented as
numeric ratings and uses Pearson’s correlation coefficient to compute similarity among
users. It predicts user preferences by computing a weighted sum of the correlation
coefficient and the ratings of positively and negatively correlated users. The results of
the comparison showed that the algorithm used in DIVA outperformed the GroupLens
algorithm in terms of both precision and recall.
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6.2. Preference elicitation via theory refinementWhile originating from our work on case-based preference elicitation, the notion of
probabilistic distance also found application in a different area: theory refinement for pref-
erence elicitation [12]. To reduce the complexity of preference elicitation, traditional ap-
proaches from Decision Analysis and Multiple Criteria Decision Making make assump-
tions concerning the structure of preferences (e.g., monotonicity or independence) and
then perform elicitation within the constraints of those assumptions. But inaccurate as-
sumptions can result in inaccurate elicitation. Nevertheless, assumptions can be a useful
guide if they at least approximately apply to some large segment of the population. Ideally
we need a method of using assumptions to guide but not constrain the elicitation process.
This kind of functionality is provided by theory refinement techniques. The basic idea be-
hind theory refinement is that we can start with a domain theory that may be approximate
and incomplete and then correct for inaccuracies and incompleteness by training on exam-
ples. If the domain theory is at least approximately correct, we can learn faster with it than
without it.
Haddawy et al. [12], explore the use of one particular theory refinement technique,
Knowledge-Based Artificial Neural Networks (KBANN), to learn user preferences. In the
case of certainty, they describe the problem of choosing a flight, where it is reasonable to
make several assumptions about preferential independence and monotonicity. They then
show how to represent these assumptions as Horn-clause theories that can be encoded in
a KBANN network. This KBANN network can be trained to learn fine-grained preference
structures from a variety of preferential data, including numeric ratings and simple binary
classification. One of the main hypothesized advantages of the KBANN technique is its
robustness to noise: the domain theory only needs to be approximately correct for KBANN
to be useful. To evaluate this hypothesis in the flight selection domain, Haddawy et al.
examine the performance of KBANN in learning preferences using examples generated
from a number of value functions that violate the independence assumptions to various
degrees. It is expected that the more a value function violates the domain theory, the worse
the performance. The hypothesis is confirmed if this decrease in performance does not
occur in a precipitous manner.
The main issue to be addressed in this robustness analysis is the definition of the degree
of violating the independence assumptions, or DOVI. Haddawy et al. define this measure
in the following way. Given a domain theory D and a value function u, note that D can be
viewed as a set of value functions that satisfy D. The DOVI measure of u violating D is
defined to be the distance between u and the member of D that is closest to u:
VD(u)= min
f∈D
δ(f,u),
where δ is the probabilistic distance between value functions. Imagine this approach as an
analogy to the definition of a distance from a point to a set of points in Euclidean geometry.
This definition of degree of violating the domain theory is semantic, a departure from
existing syntactic approaches used in robustness analysis of theory refinement techniques.
Fig. 3 shows the results of Haddawy et al.’s robustness analysis using seven preference
orders with DOVI varying from 0.05 to 0.92. They analyze the performance of KBANN
on these seven preference orders, using a training set size of 30, 50, 100, and 150, and
170 V. Ha, P. Haddawy / Artificial Intelligence 146 (2003) 149–173Fig. 3. Performance of KBANN for value functions of various degrees of violation of the independence domain
theory. The number of training examples are 30, 50, 100, and 150. The size of the set of test examples is kept
constant at 50.
keeping the test set size constant at 50. Notice that for any given number of training
examples (30, 50, 100, 150), the performance of KBANN decreases as the DOVI increases.
KBANN’s performance when the DOVI is 0.24 is still very close to when the DOVI
is 0.05. This implies that KBANN is fairly robust to some small amount of noise in
the domain theory. The sharpest performance decrease occurs when the DOVI hits the
range of 0.3 to 0.35. The fewer examples we use to train KBANN, the sharper this
performance decrease. Fewer training examples means that KBANN is relying more on
the (inaccurate) domain theory. In addition to confirming the robustness hypothesis, this
experiment also justifies the probabilistic distance as a proper measure of distance on
preferences: if it were not, the performance curves of KBANN would have been much
more random.
7. Summary
In this paper, we study the problem of similarity measures on preferences from a
decision-theoretic point of view. The focus of our investigation is the probabilistic distance,
a measure of similarity among people’s preferences that has its roots in the Kendall’s tau
function. Below are our findings:
• The probabilistic distance is theoretically attractive. It is a metric on complete
preference orders, regardless of whether the decision problem involves uncertainty
or not (Theorem 1).
• It can be computed efficiently (exactly or approximately). In the case of certainty, the
probabilistic distance on partial preferences can be approximated using a randomized
algorithm that samples uniformly randomly from the set of linear extensions of a
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partial order (Section 4.2). Under uncertainty, the problem is innately harder, because
of the complexity introduced by probabilities and utilities. We have shown that with the
reasonable assumption that the set of consistent utility functions is linearly bounded,
computing the probabilistic distance can be reduced to the well-studied problem of
computing the volumes of convex bodies for which efficient approximate algorithms
exist (Section 5.2).
In the case of certainty, the probabilistic distance theoretically appears to be better suited
for use in recommendation systems than the predominant Pearson correlation coefficient
measure. This is confirmed by the experiments with the Decision-Theoretic Video Advisor
(Section 6.1). In the case of uncertainty, the probabilistic distance is the first similarity
measure that is defined on partial preference orders. Because of its reliance on orders
instead of utilities, the probabilistic distance can be defined and computed in a wide range
of situations (Section 5).
In addition, we believe that the probabilistic distance has the potential to find
applications beyond the context of case-based preference elicitation, since it is in its most
general form a distance measure on partial orders—a topic that has not received adequate
treatment. A manifestation of this statement is the use of the probabilistic distance in the
robustness analysis of the KBANN network for user preference modeling (Section 6.2).
In the context of group decision making, the probabilistic distance may also be used to
aggregate preferences of multiple users into a single preference structure, thus playing the
same role in the uncertainty case that the Kemeny distance plays in aggregating multiple
rankings in the certainty case.
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Appendix A. Random generation of linear extensions of a partial order
We describe below an algorithm, due to Bubley and Dyer [4], that almost uniformly
randomly generates linear extensions of a partial order. The algorithm has running time
of O(n3 lognε−1), where n is the number of the elements of the partial order, and ε is the
desired accuracy, which means that the generated random linear extension has a probability
distribution that is within a total variation distance13 of ε from the uniform distribution. The
running time required to obtain a certain precision ε is often called the mixing time of the
Markov chain. A Markov chain with a mixing time polynomial with respect to the input
13 The total variation distance between two discrete distributions P,Q over a finite sample space S resembles
the Spearman’s footrule, and is defined as dTV (P,Q)= 12
∑
s∈S |P (s)−Q(s)|.
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size (which is the number of elements of the partial order in this case) and ε−1 is called
rapidly mixing.
Suppose that the partial order ≺ has n elements, and N = {1,2, . . . , n}. We encode the
orderings of these elements with the permutations of the elements of N , and the set of
linear extensions of ≺ by a subset LE(≺) of the set of all permutations of the elements
of N .
For a given concave probability distribution f on {1,2, . . . , n − 1}, define a Markov
chain Mf = {St }t0 on LE(≺) as follows. At any time point t  0, toss a fair coin.
If the coin lands head, then let St+1 = St . If the coin lands tail, then choose an index
i ∈ {1,2, . . . , n− 1} according to the distribution f . If the permutation obtained from St
by switching the ith and (i + 1)-st elements of St is also a linear extension of ≺, i.e., an
element of LE(≺), then let St+1 be this new permutation. Otherwise, let St+1 = St .
It is easily seen that Mf is ergodic with uniform stationary distribution. When f is
the uniform distribution on {1,2, . . . , n − 1}, Mf is the Karzanov–Kachiyan chain with
mixing time O(n5 logn+ n4 log ε−1) [18]. Bubley and Dyer showed that if f is defined as
f (i)= i(n− i)/K , where K = (n3 − n)/6, thenMf has mixing time of O(n3 lognε−1).
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